The transformation of the U.S. border economy since the 1980s provides a fascinating backdrop to explore how migration to the U.S-side of the Mexican border has changed vis-à-vis migration to the U.S. interior. Some long-standing patterns of border migrants remained unchanged during this period while others underwent drastic changes. For example, border migrants are consistently more likely to be female, to have migrated within Mexico, and to lack migrant networks as compared with migrants to the U.S. interior. Meanwhile, the occupational profile of border migrants has changed drastically from being predominately agricultural work to being largely made up of service-sector and sales-related work. Border migration is more sensitive to Mexican and U.S. business cycles than migration to the U.S. interior throughout the period and, while the data suggest border migrant wages may have caught up to other migrants' wages by the early 2000s, multivariate analysis indicates that border migrants who are female and/or undocumented continue to earn far less than such migrants who work in the U.S. interior. The U.S-Mexico border region has a unique economy and socio-demographic profile that sets it apart from the rest of the country. Perched between two giant nations, the border bears witness to over $350 billion in cross-border trade and well over one hundred million border crossings every year, yet has remained one of the poorest regions in the U.S. At $30,904, per capita income on the U.S. side of the border is 85 percent of the U.S. average. Without San Diego, border income is much lower-$22,302-61 percent of the U.S. average. At the same time, the Mexican side of the border is one of the wealthiest regions in Mexico; income per capita in Mexican border states is about 1.5 times that of non-border states.
across the Southwest border into the U.S. (Orrenius, 2001) . 3 This migration is largely driven by plentiful work opportunities in the U.S., although migrant networks and poor labor market conditions in Mexico play a large role in perpetuating Mexico-to-U.S. migration even during U.S. economic slowdowns. Mexican immigrants have relatively high labor force participation rates and low unemployment rates, but are among the least educated of all immigrant groups and tend to have low wages (Borjas and Katz, 2007) . As a result, they have low assimilation rates as compared with other groups, although this also stems from their lack of English fluency, undocumented status, and traditional patterns of return migration (Lazear, 2007 ).
While we know quite a bit about Mexican migration to the U.S. in general, the literature typically examines migrants' experiences in traditional gateway destinations, such as Los
Angeles, Chicago and Houston. Much less is known about Mexicans who choose to migrate to U.S. border cities. The research that has been done suggests border migrants are quite different from interior migrants. Dávila and Mora (2000) use Census data to compare the labor market characteristics of Mexicans across border and interior metropolitan areas and find that they differ in many respects, including English fluency, education, occupational distribution, and earnings.
There are many reasons why border migration should be distinct, including the uniqueness of the border economy, its two dominant languages and binational culture, large
Hispanic labor force and geographic accessibility to Mexicans. The maquiladora industry is a powerful magnet that drives much of border migration on the Mexican side. On the U.S. side, geographic accessibility is key; for example, Mexicans with proof of employment and residence in Mexico have typically been able to apply for and receive a border crossing card from the U.S.
State Department which grants them permission to cross the border regularly and visit U.S.
border cities.
This paper uses a unique data set, the Mexican Migration Project, to study how border migrants differ from average Mexican migrants with respect to their socio-demographic characteristics and migration patterns. We also consider whether migrants who work along the border earn significantly lower wages than those working in the U.S. interior and whether those wages represent a border wage penalty or something else. The results are consistent with a scenario in which access to fewer migrant networks and a strong geographic preference among border migrants may ultimately underlie their willingness to settle for lower wages on the border rather than seeking higher wages by venturing into the U.S. interior.
The Border Economy: A Framework for Migration
Given the prevalence of poverty and low education levels, the border region may in some ways appear more similar to Mexico than the rest of the U.S. Despite widespread poverty, however, the border is characterized by a dynamic economy and rapid employment growth. In the past, this has set the border region apart from other poor areas in the South where poverty is typically accompanied by economic stagnation and population decline (Dittmar and Phillips, 1999) .
Since the mid-1980s, the border has been stimulated by massive changes in the Mexican economy, stemming in part from Mexico's entry into GATT in 1986 and NAFTA in 1994, ensuing economic diversification, and much improved monetary and fiscal policy (Orrenius and Berman, 2002) . Peach and Adkisson (2007) discuss the impact that NAFTA in particular has had on the border economy, including faster job growth and falling unemployment rates.
Growth in maquiladoras, large export-oriented manufacturing plants that line the Mexican side of the border, has also been instrumental in propelling border economic growth, although the manner in which maquiladoras do so has changed over time. Sargent et al. (2007) discuss how maquiladoras evolved in the post-NAFTA era, transitioning from high job growth in the late 1990s to relatively slow growth following the industry's contraction in [2000] [2001] [2002] . Despite the recent bust, maquiladoras in Mexican border states continue to employ close to one million workers and, while the majority of plants are located in and around Ciudad Juárez and Tijuana, the smaller border towns also have a significant maquiladora presence. In addition to its impact on border city economic growth, there is empirical evidence that by attracting workers to the border from other parts of Mexico, the maquiladora industry acts as an initial stage in the migration process that often leads to workers going to the U.S. (Kopinak, 2005; Rivera-Batiz, 1986 ).
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The rapid job growth on the border since 1990, at 2.3 percent per year (compared to 1.4 percent for the U.S.), helped push border unemployment rates down from double to single digits, with unemployment reaching unprecedented lows in the early 2000s. Post-NAFTA, border job growth was marked by big expansions in transportation, government, financial and real estate, and retail and wholesale trade employment, with much of the growth tied to the rise in trade between Mexico and the U.S., border population growth, and the strength and stability of the Mexican peso. Since the late 1990s, the strong peso has motivated the dramatic influx of Mexican shoppers to U.S. border retail stores.
More formal analysis of border business cycles in Texas supports the contention that, in the case of the smaller border cities, economic growth is predominantly driven by Mexican, not U.S., conditions (Phillips and Cañas, 2006) . Larger U.S. border cities, such as El Paso, are more dependent on the maquiladora industry which is, in turn, dependent on the volume of U.S.
industrial production and hence the U.S. business cycle. northward. To the extent that it is easier to cross into the border than the U.S. interior, we expect border migration to be more sensitive to economic conditions than interior migration.
In addition to economic conditions, migrant networks have long been identified as key factors in Mexican migration decisions because they are a form of migration-related social capital. In fact, because a group's migration experience can have such a large impact on individuals, sociologists sometimes refer to the 'social process of migration' (Massey et al., 1987) . In empirical work, networks are typically defined as relatives who have prior migration experience and who may even be living abroad. Networks are important to migration decisions because they provide information to potential migrants about crossing the border and finding employment and housing in the U.S. In recent years, as illegal border crossings have become more dangerous and expensive, networks have also become an important means by which migrants raise funds to pay their smugglers. Because it is easier for Mexican newcomers both to get into U.S. border cities and to obtain housing and employment information, we expect networks should matter less to border migration than to interior migration. Although we could not find published work looking at this question for the border, Reyes and Mameesh (2002) found that Mexican migrants to Texas come from households with less migration history than migrants to interior destinations in Illinois and California.
Data and Methods
We use the Mexican Migration Project (MMP114) to investigate border migration and wages. 7 The MMP data, while it is not representative of all Mexican migrants to the U.S., is one Migration to a border destination is modeled using a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression where migration is a function of migrant characteristics, economic conditions in Mexico and the U.S., U.S. immigration policy and time trends. Immigration policy variables include the number of temporary visas issued to Mexicans and the intensity of Border Patrol enforcement as measured by their hours spent patrolling the border ('linewatch' hours). The regression specification and the variables are described in more detail in the Appendix.
Summary Statistics: Characteristics of Border Migrants
Mexican migrants to U.S. border cities differ significantly from Mexican migrants to other U.S. destinations during our sample period (see Table 1 ). They have more years of education, are more likely to be female and tend to come from slightly smaller families. They are less likely to report that they speak no English. These summary statistics (and those below)
are consistent with Dávila and Mora (2000) who, using decadal Census data, also find that
Mexicans on the border are more educated and have greater English fluency.
According to MMP, Mexican migrants on the border are much more likely to be from northern Mexico, with 53 percent from northern non-border states and 22 percent from border states, and from communities with less migration experience (hence fewer migrant networks).
Migrants to the U.S. interior, meanwhile, tend to be from central and western Mexico and from communities with significantly more parent and sibling networks.
Border migrants are significantly less likely to cross into the U.S. illegally and are more likely to have a history as domestic migrants, migrating within Mexico before deciding to work in the U.S. Once in the U.S., border migrants are much more likely to hold service-and salessector jobs, while migrants to the U.S. interior are much more likely to be employed as production and farm workers. Overall, border migrants earn $1.61 less per hour (in 2006 dollars) on average than migrants in the U.S. interior. There is a slightly higher concentration of professionals among border migrants as compared with migrants to the interior. An important subgroup among Mexican professionals on the border are factory owners, managers and executives, many of whom are likely working in maquiladoras in Mexico while living on the U.S. side of the border.
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There are interesting patterns over time. Between 1989 and 1997 , the data show a rising share of trips to U.S. border cities vis-à-vis the U.S. interior (Figure 1 ). The spike in border migration in 1995 is particularly striking. Dubbed the 'Tequila Crisis', the 1995 Mexican economic downturn saw the value of the peso drop by 49 percent and Mexican GDP contract 7.1 percent. During this time, the border was an escape valve for Mexicans hurt by the recession.
The drop-off in border migration after 1997 is largely an artifact of the way the MMP data is collected; the sample sizes become smaller towards the end of the time period as communities fall out of the sampling frame. The decline is particularly severe among border migrants since they are a much smaller sample to begin with.
In good times and bad, females are a disproportionate share of migrants to U.S. border cities (Figure 2 ). This likely stems from several factors, including the nature of border labor demand. Maquiladoras have traditionally relied on a predominately female workforce and have acted as a magnet for such migrants from other parts of Mexico. Also, female migrants have always found plentiful work opportunities along the U.S. side of the border in domestic service industries and, more recently, retail and hospitality. It may also be the case that female migrants prefer to remain close to their families, more so than male migrants, and so they are reluctant to venture into the U.S. interior. Sáenz et al. (2007) point out that Mexican immigrant women generally tend to cluster in jobs and areas that are predominately Mexican.
Over time, the share of trips that are illegal has been consistently lower among migrants to border cities than among migrants to the interior (Figure 3 
Results

Migrant Choice of Destination
Many of the differences between border and interior migration spells suggested by the figures are borne out by the regression results listed in Table 2 . Border migrants are much more likely to be female and to first have migrated domestically. They have significantly fewer migrant networks and are less likely to be on their first trip than are migrants to the U.S. interior.
The picture that emerges is one where border migrants come from communities with a shorter migration history and less U.S. migration overall than do migrants to the U.S. interior. As a result, they are less vested in U.S. migration and are likely to also try domestic (within Mexico) migration. Because their time is more divided between the U.S. and Mexico, they have slightly fewer U.S. trips and less U.S. experience than do migrants to the interior (as shown in Table 1 ).
In essence, border migration appears to be slightly less structural in nature and perhaps more circular and less permanent. However, average U.S. trip durations are not shorter among border migrants than they are among migrants to the interior, which is a bit puzzling.
These differences hold up across the various specifications in Table 2 as we add more control variables for region of origin (column 2), economic conditions (column 3) and U.S.
immigration policy (column 4). The results from column 2 confirm that border migrants are much more likely to be from Mexican border states and from northern Mexican states than are migrants to the U.S. interior. Adding region-of-origin control variables renders the coefficient on illegal status insignificantly different from zero, which suggests that migrants to the border are less likely to make illegal crossings but that this is largely a result of their northern Mexican origins. Residents of northern Mexico are more apt to have border crossing cards or other temporary visas than are Mexicans in the center and south of the country, hence they are more likely to cross the border legally (this does not mean that they have legal permission to work, which typically requires a work-based visa, a green card or U.S. citizenship).
Economic conditions also influence border migration in much the same way as we predicted with the exception of border employment, which takes on the wrong sign (Table 2, columns 3 and 4). Clearly, one would expect border employment growth to attract, not repel, migrant workers. In our preferred specification in column 4, labor demand appears to be better captured by U.S. employment as a whole; that coefficient is strongly positive and suggests that a 10 percent increase in employment leads to a 15 percent increase in migration to border cities. It is possible that our measure of border employment has the wrong sign because it is picking up the effect of Mexican employment growth. We discussed above how the border economy is strongly influenced by Mexican conditions, more so than by the U.S. economy, which suggests that border employment is highly correlated with employment on the Mexican side. In other words, our measure of border employment confounds Mexican economic conditions, which tend to push out Mexicans when bad, and U.S. economic conditions, which tend to pull in Mexicans when good.
In general, the results suggest that border migration is much more sensitive to U.S. and
Mexican economic conditions than migration to the interior. In addition to the large coefficient on U.S. employment, there is also a very large significant effect of Mexican GDP and interest rates on border migration. According to the results, a 1 percent decline in Mexican GDP leads to a 0.4 percent rise in border migration. A 10 percent rise in short-term interest rates leads similarly to a 0.4 percent rise in border migration relative to migration to the interior.
Column 4 also adds the immigration policy variables, and the results are also as one would predict. Visa issuances are correlated with worker migration to the border, significantly more so than they are correlated with such migration to the interior. This is despite the fact that these visas are overwhelmingly for tourists, not workers, and those who work in the U.S. while on tourist visas are violating the law. While visas attract border migration, Border Patrol enforcement repels it. The coefficient on linewatch hours is large and negative, suggesting that a 10 percent increase in linewatch hours reduces border migration relative to interior migration by 2.7 percent. This result is consistent with the studies that have documented a pronounced increase in border relative to interior enforcement during the sample period, particularly in the years following the passage of IRCA (Dávila, Pagán and Grau, 1999) .
Migrant Wages
As we saw above, border migrants are distinct in many ways, but it is unclear how these differences will play out in terms of the rewards to migration-their wages. From Table 1 Table 3 , with column 2 adding control variables for region of origin and column 3 adding interactions of certain key variables with a border dummy variable.
Migrant wages are substantially lower for border workers, older workers, females and workers with illegal status. They are significantly higher for workers with more years of education (although an additional year of education is only associated with a 1 percent rise in wages). Despite the fact that education is relatively scarce on the border, the interaction term of education and border is not statistically significant, suggesting that returns to education are not higher on the border after all-at least not for Mexican migrants. This result could have something to do with the limited transferability of education credentials or the low quality of Mexican schooling in origin communities.
Females earn 25 to 27 percent less than otherwise-similar men, a gap that is substantially larger for females who work on the border. The coefficient on the interaction between female and border in column 3 suggests an additional 16 percent deficit for women who stay close to Mexico. Sáenz et al. (2007) find a smaller border wage penalty for Mexican women, about 8.3
percent, but they limit their analysis to the four border states. Some of the earnings differential is due to the type of jobs Mexican immigrant women tend to hold, particularly on the border, such as nannies, housekeepers and retail workers. Dávila and Mora (2000) note that occupational sorting of Mexican females on the border into the low-paying service sector has suppressed their earnings.
Illegal immigrants earn about 14 percent less than otherwise-similar workers who crossed the border legally. This gap is even larger along the border, as indicated by the large negative coefficient on the interaction of illegal and border in column 3 (-0.16). U.S. work experience is also an important determinant of wages, although the coefficient on the border interaction suggests that U.S. experience is less valued on the border than in the interior (it is not statistically significant, however).
Is there a border wage penalty? The coefficient on the border destination dummy in columns 1 and 2 is significant and negative and suggestive of a border wage penalty of 16 to 20 percent. However, once the border interactions are included in column 3, the border wage penalty appears to be largely related to the nature of the border labor supply and border skill prices. Border migrants earn less on average because they are more likely to be female than migrants to the interior. Also, illegal immigrants on the border earn significantly less, presumably because they have to compete with a large binational pool of workers full of people with similar skills and backgrounds but who can work legally in the U.S.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
This study uses unique Mexican household survey data to look at how border migration differs from Mexican migration to the U.S. interior. Border migrants are more likely to be female, to have migrated within Mexico and to lack migrant networks as compared with migrants to the U.S. interior. Over time, the occupational profile of border migrants has changed from being predominately agricultural work to being largely made up of service-sector and salesrelated work. Border migration has also become predominately legal.
Border migration has remained highly sensitive to Mexican and U.S. business cycles and to immigration policy variables, much more so than migration to the U.S. interior. And while the data suggest raw border migrant wages caught up to other migrants' wages by the early 2000s, wage regressions indicate that border migrants who are female and/or undocumented continue to earn far less than such migrants who choose to work in the U.S. interior. It is likely that access to fewer migrant networks and strong geographic preferences, driven by a desire for proximity to Mexico, outweigh the wage penalty in the minds of these migrants and help account for their concentration along the border. The cost of living is also lower along the border, which further shrinks the 'real' wage gap with the interior.
An interesting extension of these findings is to ask whether the border migration pattern discussed here is along the lines of what one would expect if a guest-worker program were implemented to allow for the legal temporary migration of Mexican workers to the U.S. Similar to border migration, guest-worker migration would be highly cyclical, largely temporary and attractive to Mexican workers who desire short-term employment in the U.S. Conditional on having an employment offer, guest workers would face much lower migration costs than illegal immigrants to the interior, much like many border migrants today. The result would be flexible migration and less public burden associated with permanent settlement, but also more female migrants and migrants with less education. 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Return Year
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Border City Non-Border City where the dependent variable, border destination, takes on the value 1 if the migrant chooses a border destination and 0 otherwise. 11 The covariates include both time-varying variables, X it , and time-invariant variables, Z i . Time-varying controls include a migrant's age in the year of the start of the trip, a dummy variable equal to 1 for an illegal crossing (and 0 for a legal crossing), a dummy variable equal to 1 for it being a migrant's first trip (instead of last, since we examine both first and last trips), and a dummy variable for domestic migration (equal to 1 in cases where the person first migrated within Mexico). Migrant networks are also time-varying and measured by the share of households in the home community that have a household head with a parent or sibling who has migrated to the U.S. previously.
Time-invariant covariates are measured at the time of survey and include the number of years of education, a female dummy variable (equal to 1 if the migrant is female, 0 for males), family size, and dummy variables for 3 of the 4 places of origin (which we classify into west, north, central and border states, as noted above). In addition, certain specifications include the economic control variables described above, including logged values of border employment, U.S. employment, real Mexican GDP and Mexican short-term interest rates. Two controls for immigration policy are also added to certain specifications, the log of the number of temporary visas issued to Mexicans and the log of Border Patrol linewatch hours. Means of the aggregate variables are reported in Table A1 . Lastly, a linear time trend and its square are included to control for the common trend in the aggregate variables, such as employment and GDP. 
